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the applicant's probabilities of parole adjustment based on behavior attitudinal changes and accomplishments within the institution.

He will probably be released without any real preparation for the job secured for him and placed under the supervision of a parole officer whom he has never seen before and who on the first contact makes sure the releasee is fully aware of the fact that he can be sent back for any of a whole series of violations, many of which are ludicrous in a contemporary society. Or he may on the other hand have spent part time during the last few months in the institution attending prerelease meetings, may have met his parole officer and may have found in that officer, a counselor, a friend and guide.

But the very real probability is that beginning with arrest through the jail until final release from probation or parole, he will have had an experience which reflects nothing of a continuous, meaningful, supervision and experience. All too little of his experiences will have been with anyone except other offenders and officers of the court or institution. He will have very little feeling that he has undergone a kind of social process in which he has relationships with normal people leading normal lives in a normal community. With few exceptions, we have a long way to go in this country to create, develop, and administer a continuous correctional process which is designed to retrain, redevelop, and create maximum impact toward social adjustment of offenders.

When I referred earlier to the need for research and development I perhaps sounded a little too academic and you may well have wondered: Can we really apply the principle of research and development to corrections? I think so. If a correctional administrator genuinely and seriously wants to determine the extent to which his system is succeeding or failing in reaching accepted goals then he needs research. He will then want to determine whether more effective techniques, methods and programs can be designed than those which have been traditionally used. This means setting up new kinds of approaches and measuring the results against those which have been traditionally used. This may apply to a wide range of program elements. It may mean a complete reexamination of the philosophy on which traditional approaches have been based. Results of self-study, and research, and demonstration projects may, in turn, have tremendous impact upon modifying, revising, and changing the philosophy of correctional administration.

What new kinds of development can we foresee? Let's examine together for a moment one recent major development in corrections: a rising interest in the halfway house. Community groups—including several religious organizations—saw the need for a bridge between institutions and the community. Halfway houses were established in a number of cities including Los Angeles; Chicago; Minneapolis; Wilmington, Del.; St. Louis; and others. These took a variety of forms from small family residential units to larger come-one-come-all programs. An institution in New York State for delinquent girls developed several halfway houses which were in reality residential facilities within a city supplementing the residential programs at the institution.

In our Federal correctional system, we now have four prerelease guidance centers for youthful offenders, in New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago. A fifth will open this spring here in Washington, D.C.

I believe the halfway house concept should be extended to selected adult prisoners, now that it has proven its worth among youthful offenders.

Another imaginative new program that I believe would prove successful for Federal prisoners is a work-release program similar

to those employed in such State systems as Wisconsin and North Carolina. This plan was conceived as the Huber law in Wisconsin. Under the plan, penitentiary inmates are employed outside the prison during the day, after suitability has been determined by staff evaluation.

In a visit to North Carolina last year, I learned that of 10,000 prisoners committed to the North Carolina prison system, nearly 1,000 work under this work-release program, paying expenses for board and room at the prison, supporting families, sometimes saving money and maintaining and developing skills. Transfers from institutions to the community become almost a paper transaction.

The entire State of North Carolina, as represented by newspaper editorials, accepts and is extremely proud of its development. I learned recently that California is now creating an extensive work-release program. In this kind of change we can foresee changes in philosophy as the result of evaluation and demonstration projects which may well pinpoint a revolution in our field.

Professor Glaser's study of inmates released from Federal institutions which has been carried on for the past 5 years under a grant from the Ford Foundation, is resulting in revision of institutional programs in the Federal system. All of us are acquainted with the California research on probation officer caseloads, on intensive parole supervision, in administration. Although I cite only a few examples, I hope they are perceptible as indexes of the kind of correctional administration which can produce planned change.

The need for completely new concepts of management in personnel training and development is becoming abundantly clear. I suggested earlier that we are inclined to think we have a good correctional institution if we have an experienced warden and some staff people who have been trained in the behavioral sciences. But thus far, our training of line personnel—that is the people who have the regular day to day contacts with institution inmates—is restricted usually to not more than high school graduation. In service training is devoted primarily to correctional skills such as counts, locks, locking devices, use of gas, riot plans, escape plans. Yet these are the people who deal most directly and have the greatest impact upon the inmates of our institutions. Because of the compelling need for this kind of training, our center at Southern Illinois University is designing a subprofessional training curriculum for correctional officers. Briefly, this is planned to be a 2-year subprofessional curriculum, designed to instill insights and understandings from the behavioral sciences and some skills in dealing with behavior problems. We can't possibly insist that every correctional worker must have a college degree. As a matter of fact, unemployed youth and young adults can be remotivated and given training for jobs in corrections. This will elevate the base competence of the whole body of correctional personnel.

Moreover, we need extended and continuous training in public administration for our administrators. We need training at the supervisory level and continuous development of people working in the behavioral disciplines. It is from this kind of philosophy of personnel administration that we can accelerate the evolution of corrections.

Finally, I have spoken of our failure to use community resources. All too often we think that in corrections we can't get on with the job unless we have all the staff needed on our immediate payroll. This simply isn't true. A new trend to build correctional institutions in close proximity to universities is a case in point. Universities offer tremendous resources which have been used all too

rarely and all too little in years gone by; and yet, in terms of personnel training and development, research in the behavioral sciences and consulting services in sociology, in education, in special education, and vocational training are available in the larger universities. This conference is evident of the fact that universities are available as resources for correctional development.

But beyond this there are available a wide variety of other resources. Talent can be brought into the institution from the community. Inmates can be taken from the institutions into the community for purposes other than a work-release program. I need only mention League of Women Voters, or women's clubs, various professional societies who are always willing to help in public institutions; libraries, recreation associations and so on through a long list of community resources which we have rarely attempted to use. In probation and parole, I like these recent experimental programs which bring small groups of probationers and parolees together under the guidance of psychologists and group therapists, or skilled probation officers who can discuss with a group their common problems. This I think will one day lead to the development of new kinds of community correctional facilities based right in the community as contrasted to our present jails and prisons all too often off in some far part of the community or the State. Yes, we must look to the use of community resources in a way never dreamed of up to this time.

I am convinced that one of our serious mistakes is to try to rehabilitate everyone. We extend the same processes, procedures, and programs to all. I get a little weary sometimes of going to large penitentiaries and seeing old, recidivistic offenders being given vocational training, education, and the gamut of our treatment processes for the third, fourth, or fifth time. Now this is a little dangerous to say. I don't mean that we should return to the old bighouse philosophy. On the other hand, I think we must begin to be selective in the use of our resources, particularly personnel and funds. When we try to give the same kind of education, treatment, and therapy to the old lugs that we give to the youthful and young adult offenders, we usually wind up with the youth and young offenders getting a pretty skimpy program. Realistic administration must concentrate the resources on those offenders and in those areas which are most promising. This, coupled with research and development, would suggest that we can become much more realistic than we have up to now.

I told you of my recent visit to North Carolina. I asked Mr. George Randal, commissioner of corrections, how he was able to accomplish all these interesting new developments in his State. He leaned back in his chair, "Well, I am tired of hearing correctional administrators declare 'I have nothing to do with politics in my system'." Says Randal, "That's not at all realistic. I have to look to the legislature and to State officials for support, for understanding, for funds, for personnel, and for the means to accomplish about everything I want to. I'm one of the most active politicians in my State."

"I know everybody in the legislature. I see them frequently. I don't go through a State senator's county without stopping to say hello. I argue the hard facts of corrections with them. I do everything in my power to influence them to support corrections and they are supporting it. And it does pay off."

I suggest that Commissioner Randal has a convincing approach to the relationship between corrections and political realities.

Another fact I have seen demonstrated in a number of places around the country, not only in North Carolina, is that correctional administrators all too often underestimate

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the public. If we give them the information and spell out the public's stake in good corrections, we may well discover that they're far ahead of us in accepting new approaches in corrections. The Huber law, under which jail inmates work in the community and return to the jail at night, is fully accepted in Wisconsin. When the public understands the issues involved, they are intrigued with the human approaches and will insist upon them. In North Carolina the new kind of program which places a thousand working inmates in the community each day is accepted editorially by every newspaper in the State. I am coming to believe that the old saw that "we can't move very far ahead of the public" is a delusion and is perpetuated by many of us in corrections as an alibi for our own failures to get on with the job which the future demands.

LIBERALIZATION OF VETERANS PENSION LIMITATIONS—RESOLUTION

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a most thoughtful and important resolution was recently adopted by Maco Steward Post No. 20 of the American Legion, Galveston, Tex. In order that this matter may be more fully understood by other Senators, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas existing legislation (sec. 503 of title 38, United States Code) sets limits on war veterans' incomes for eligibility to draw the veterans pension well below the "poverty" level now recognized as a basis for economic opportunity needs;

Whereas many pensioners and annuitants, because of the poverty income level set by existing law, are not eligible to enjoy the benefits of cost-of-living increases granted to an individual under public or private retirement, annuity, endowment or similar type plans or programs, and some veterans must either forgo or waive such paid-in benefits as those offered under certain public or private retirement plans; and

Whereas veterans with only the small pension for support find themselves in utterly dire circumstances and are all but humiliated by a government pledged to give reasonable recognition for services rendered in the interest of national security: Be it

Resolved, That either the aforementioned income limitations be raised to more reasonable levels, so as to remove the "poverty" penalty and stigma, or that a law be enacted by the Congress to amend section 503 of title 38 of the United States Code to exclude from consideration as income for the purpose of determining pension eligibility, all amounts paid to an individual under public or private retirement, annuity, endowment, or similar type plans or programs. (Attention is invited to H.R. 5677 already offered and scheduled for study by the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is recommended that this bill be amended to afford relief for veterans who are ineligible for retirement pay under programs other than the pension legislation.)

C. E. BLAKEMAN,
Commander.
THAD A. LAW,
Adjutant.

The above resolution was adopted by this post on March 18, 1965, at a regular meeting of this post.

REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, a well-known and respected columnist, Doris Fleeson, has written a revealing article concerning the current effort to stop the reapportionment of both houses of the State legislatures on the basis of population.

With her usual no-nonsense approach, Miss Fleeson has dug into the core of the proposals to reverse the Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th amendment require that each citizen's vote not only count, but count equally, in both houses of his State legislature. She points out, correctly, that Congress gives the appearance of having one hand not know what the other is doing: while Congress appears intent on enforcing the constitutional right of Negroes to register and to vote, through the new Voting Rights Act, a large number of its Members appear anxious to permanently deprive Negroes and many other citizens of the constitutional right to have their vote count equally with that of other citizens.

This article should be widely read. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Efforts To Blunt the Urban Vote," from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 30, 1965, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DORIS FLEESON—EFFORTS TO BLUNT THE URBAN VOTE

WASHINGTON.—A Senate preparing to pass a voting rights bill with a whoop and a holler is simultaneously engaged in wrapping up a stupendous lollipop for the status quo not only in the South but all over the country.

It will cut down the value of the Negro's vote when he gets it together with that of other minorities and all the voters who cram the urban areas where 85 percent of Americans now live. This will be the effect, and not very heavily disguised intent, of the sweetmeat which will nullify the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" ruling of June 15, 1964.

A constitutional amendment wrapper has been fixed upon, and a judiciary subcommittee on such moves is holding hearings on what form it should take. However, the yeas were there at the start in that citadel of conservatism of which Senator JAMES EASTLAND is chairman.

The central structure embraces the principle that States should be permitted to apportion one house of their legislatures on a basis other than population. This immense latitude is qualified by the proviso that a majority of the people must vote for the change. How this would work out in practice is unclear.

The project, and especially the timing, is again from the hand of the old master, Republican leader EVERETT DIRKSEN. DIRKSEN is at the peak of his popularity for his civil rights services. President Johnson's close relations with him in the practice of consensus lend him a helpful coloration in the matter of prestige.

DIRKSEN has a valid and 100 percent Republican reason for his efforts. His party's rural roots are vital to its power in many

States, including New York. That is why the liberal Senator JACOB JAVITS is going along part of the way.

Also, DIRKSEN senses the need for haste even on such a large and significant question. The battle to get fair reapportionment by the Court's standard has hardly been joined. As it progresses, if it is allowed to, the public's understanding of what is at stake will mount. This is especially true of the civil rights forces, who stand to gain the most under the voting rights bill which now preoccupies them.

There are many extraordinary aspects of the Senate's haste to fall in line behind DIRKSEN's banner.

The big States with their great cities are the base of the Democratic Party's strength and must continue to be. The topheavy majorities that they have enabled the party to gain in Congress seem to have no place in the thinking of Senate Democratic Leader MIKE MANSFIELD, who once more is prepared to swing along with his opposition leader.

Really staggering, however, is the Senate's near-total indifference to the true condition of the State legislatures in today's world. Even casual readers of newspapers must observe their many internal weaknesses. Experts have come to question their capacity to deal with new and complex questions.

Their conflicts of interest are a cliché. These arise out of the poor support they get from home as well as their poor pay.

It would appear that the Senate should be welcoming the winds of change to air the stale legislative chambers and give the States a better chance. Instead, it seems bent on defending the indefensible, and it is a charge upon the whole Senate to explore what is really being defended.

FREEDOM ACADEMY SUPPORT PYRAMIDING

Mr. MONDT. Mr. President, recently the Atlanta Constitution editorially sought reason for the decline in the strategic position of the United States in southeast Asia. Editors of the paper view our air strikes in North Vietnam as evidencing our ineptitude in the type of warfare we have faced there, causing policymakers to shore up our position by resort to quite a different type warfare—one in which we excel. But these editors warn that in order to realize our policy goals in Asia, we have still to solve the fundamental problem: How to win in nonmilitary warfare.

We may win battles in the name of peoples, but unless we win the peoples themselves they will go their own way regardless of how the battles went. Most South Vietnamese care little about ideological terms like communism and democracy. They'll go with the government that offers them the best system for meeting their own needs.

It is more clearly stated. The Atlanta Constitution identifies the area of our weakness:

Bombing may end the shooting, but the Vietcong may win the war. If our counter-insurgency effort in South Vietnam was insufficient, then we must value the lessons learned and perfect the system, not overlook the lessons and abandon the system.

Our failure in Vietnam has been primarily political, not military, and superficial bombing cannot erase the need for some long-range learning on the part of the United States. Political effectiveness must accompany it, or the decisions will be un-

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favorable ones, and communism can still take the underdeveloped world.

This states the problem very plainly. Strategic computations indicate that we can hold on militarily in southeast Asia. But a military holding action is only temporary. Real victory will be achieved by one side or the other through superior application of techniques of nonmilitary warfare—persuasion, popular conviction that either one governing system or the other "offers them the best system for meeting their own needs."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the editorial entitled "United States Must Not Quit Too Easily on Basic Problem in Vietnam," from the Atlanta Constitution of March 6, 1965, be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

The Atlanta Constitution, incidentally, has editorially endorsed the Freedom Academy bill.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution of Mar. 6, 1965]

UNITED STATES MUSTN'T QUIT TOO EASILY ON BASIC PROBLEM IN VIETNAM

Our American tendency to leap to wholehog conclusions may yet dissipate and destroy the hard lessons we have learned in Vietnam.

The current bombing of North Vietnam has reconstituted the U.S. position in South Vietnam. It has probably made negotiations for a cease-fire possible.

If luck runs well, the United States may soon be able to sit down across the table from the Communists and settle the war as we have known it.

If this had been tried a month ago, the Communists would have been able to derogate U.S. demands and ask, "If we don't agree, what are you going to do about it?" Under the old rules the United States could only have said, "We will fight you in the paddies for 10 more years," and might have had to.

Now, if negotiations come to pass, and the Communists ask, "What are you going to do about it if we don't agree?" the United States can reply, "We are going to remove a dozen more of your North Vietnamese towns from the map of Asia." Thus the bombing has presented to the Communists a wholly new encouragement to talk seriously about peace.

This is altogether to be desired. And if negotiations now come to pass, and end to the guerrilla war may be in sight.

But we Americans will be throwing away everything we have learned in Vietnam if we jump to either of two assumptions: First, that this means South Vietnam will stay non-Communist, and second, that this means U.S. military counterinsurgency in the paddies is a failure and that bombing alone is decisive.

The fact is that while bombing in conjunction with the years of counterinsurgency may bring the war to a decision point, the decision may be delusive. For if we assume that a mere guaranteed cease-fire and a graceful U.S. withdrawal can settle the Communist issue for the South Vietnamese, we're probably wrong; they may promptly opt for communism themselves, under the various prevailing pressures.

We may win battles in the name of peoples, but unless we win the peoples themselves they will go their own way regardless of how the battles went. Most South Vietnamese care little about ideological terms like communism and democracy. They'll go with the government that offers them the best system for meeting their own needs.

Communism has long assumed it can meet southeast Asia's needs better than free systems can, and even if the Vietcong is forced by our bombing to make a surface peace now, their long-range assumption will persist. The only real answer to the Communist assumption is to prove our own assumption—that free systems can excel communism in meeting the needs of people. This has been a major part of our 10-year ground effort in South Vietnam, with the military spearheading it. It has been inconclusive. Otherwise the bombing of North Vietnam wouldn't have been needed. While it has failed in many areas of the country, however, it has succeeded in many areas. It also is the really meaningful combat out there. It has been a start along the right track.

Yet if bombing of North Vietnam proves superficially effective in bringing a surface end to the short-range shooting in the south, Americans may be tempted to write off the counterinsurgency, civic action, and special forces techniques on the ground, and assume bombing is all we need. There are indications within the U.S. Army itself that this mistake is about to be made. It would be a dangerous mistake. Bombing may end the shooting, but the Vietcong may win the war. If our counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam was insufficient, then we must value the lessons learned and perfect the system, not overlook the lessons and abandon the system.

No matter what short-term papers the bombers may force the Communists to sign, the long-term dispositions in southeast Asia will be decided by the people who live there. And if communism offers them more effective political, economic, social, and military systems than we can muster, our failures on the ground will endure long after our heroes in the air have been forgotten. Our failure in Vietnam has been primarily political, not military, and superficial bombing cannot erase the need for some long-range learning on the part of the United States. The start we made over the past 10 years in Vietnam may have been one of the most valuable strides toward realistic competition with communism that this Nation has undertaken. Military power is required to force decisions, as we have learned. But political effectiveness must accompany it, or the decisions will be unfavorable ones, and communism can still take the underdeveloped world.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, a recent New York Times article concurs in the contention of our inadequacy in psychological warfare. Written by Seth S. King, the article quotes an American adviser to the South Vietnamese:

They [the Vietcong] always take the initiative and we can only try to run around and put out the fires.

To be perfectly honest, the Army of South Vietnam just isn't interested in psychological warfare. They think it's a waste of time even if we are willing to make most of the effort for them.

I ask unanimous consent that this article, entitled "Vietcong Ahead in Propaganda War", from the New York Times of March 17, 1965, be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 17, 1965.]

VIETCONG AHEAD IN PROPAGANDA WAR

(By Seth S. King)

BAN METHUOT, SOUTH VIETNAM, March 15.—Rejoin your loved ones who are longing to see you. You are only being used as bullet shields by the Communists. Your Government will help you return to your homes."

Leaflets bearing this message have been floating down on towns and villages in the sparsely populated but strategically vital Central Highlands of South Vietnam.

The leaflets have been aimed at persuading young Vietnamese who have joined the Vietcong guerrillas to desert and return to their families.

The effort is part of a new campaign of psychological warfare inspired and financed by the United States and pressed upon the South Vietnamese Army by young American military advisers.

The United States is planning to expand the large information force already in South Vietnam and to provide it with more money.

In the last 6 weeks as the struggle for control of the highlands has moved into a new phase as the Vietcong try to cut South Vietnam in two. The propaganda war that has accompanied this drive has also been stepped up, and once again the Vietcong appear to have sped past the Government.

Vietcong agents have been matching the Government at every turn, even in the distribution of expertly printed leaflets in two colors.

Where the Government must fly over the sector in American planes equipped with loudspeakers, the Vietcong go into the villages and spend several days employing the "three withs"—eating with, sleeping with, and working with the people.

Communist guerrillas have shown unexpected speed and dexterity in spreading their propaganda in the highlands.

REGIME EFFORT ASSAILED

A Vietcong leaflet picked up at Quaingduc, near the Cambodian border, contained on one side the following: "Struggle for better pay and guarantee of long life. Do not support the Government in its fighting. If you do you will die and your life will be wasted."

On the other side of the leaflet was a brief newsletter telling of Vietcong successes in the attack on the American billet at Quinhon and in closing Route 1 along the coast. It ended by saying that members of the Government "are fighting each other in Saigon even now."

The leaflet was dated February 19, the day of the most recent coup d'etat attempted in Saigon.

Other leaflets have been found all over the area promising "help and kind treatment" to regular soldiers who are "anti-American" and who "throw down their weapons."

The Vietcong have been equally quick to turn the Government's propaganda to their own advantages. Government troops recently found booklets in a number of villages. The cover was the same as that of a Government booklet explaining the protected-hamlet program; inside was a Vietcong propaganda tract.

Since the first week in February, when the Vietcong opened their drive in the Central Highlands, the guerrilla influence has trebled in Darlac Province an American adviser said.

"They always take the initiative and we can only try to run around and put out the fires," he said.

"To be perfectly honest," he went on, "the Army of South Vietnam just isn't interested in psychological warfare. They think it's a waste of time even if we are willing to make most of the effort for them."

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, if we had instituted something like the Freedom Academy when the concept was first approved by the Senate in 1960, we would have had a facility at which to familiarize Vietnamese officials with the art of nonmilitary warfare. One can marvel at their hesitancy to utilize psychological techniques in their fight against Com-

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munist subversion, but one must also marvel at why our Government has been so hesitant to recognize that our failure to provide pertinent training in this field for foreign nationals who want it is opening a void in total defense against Communist and other totalitarian aggression.

Sponsors of the Freedom Academy bill in the Senate, Senators CASE, DODD, DOUGLAS, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, LAUSCHE, MILLER, PROUTY, PROXMIER, SCOTT, SMATHERS, MURPHY, and myself, have, in introducing the bill, asked Congress to appraise U.S. global strategy in its entirety. We perceive critical fault in this country's appraisal of contesting world forces. As a Government, we refuse to accredit sincerity to the long-range challenge we face.

As I have discussed this matter in recent weeks — CONGRESSIONAL RECORD pages 4059, 4751-4753, 5276-5281—a whole new academic discipline concentrated around nonmilitary aggression has grown to maturity over the last generation, and is functioning under Communist direction; but the United States has not kept apace. By section 2(a)(2) of the Freedom Academy bill, Congress would recognize this inadequacy. We state:

The Communist bloc and the various Communist parties have systematically prepared themselves to wage a thousand-pronged aggression in the nonmilitary area. Drawing on their elaborate studies and extensive pragmatic tests, Communist leaders have developed their conspiratorial version of nonmilitary conflict into an advanced, operational art in which they employ and orchestrate an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments in the political, psychological, ideological, economic, technological, organizational and paramilitary areas enabling them to approach their immediate and long-range objectives along many paths. This creates unique and unprecedented problems for the United States in a conflict that is being waged in student organizations, peasant villages, labor unions, mass communication systems, in city and jungle, and institutions and organizations of every description, as well as in the world's chancelleries. Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict makes extraordinary demands upon its practitioners, the Communists for several decades have intensively trained their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of basic, intermediate, and advanced schools. The Sino-Soviet conflict capacity has been immeasurably increased by the mobilization of research, science, industry, technology, and education. . . .

Now one of the great American authorities on military affairs, Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, has contributed his evaluation of total U.S. strategy; and his evaluation is consistent with these findings in the Freedom Academy bill. Writing in the November-December, 1964, issue of Ordinance, Mr. Baldwin says of our position:

... the threat [we face] is opportunistic, massive, and unrelenting, and it takes many forms—ideological, political, economic, psychological, and military. We must be prepared for a spectrum of conflict from such nuclear power confrontations as the Cuban missile crisis to a twilight war against Communist puppets.

But by far the greatest threat—one that has so far frustrated us—is the so-called "war of national liberation," the kind of

guerrilla, terrorist, and insurgency conflict now being waged in South Vietnam.

By establishing something like the Freedom Academy, Congress would move meaningfully toward squarely confronting this threat. We propose intensive research into a new spectrum of warfare about which we know so little. We propose to train our people and our allies' people in knowledge about the new spectrum, to improve their effectiveness in resisting nonmilitary aggression where it occurs. Our defense depends on these people. They should be fully knowledgeable about tactics used against us.

We do not propose to imitate Communist methods. We do propose to understand Communist methods, in order to be more effective against them.

Hanson Baldwin concisely assesses our strategic situation.

A great many of the new nations . . . [are] almost certainly destined to disappear from the map of history. Many . . . do not have the political, economic, or military power, or the population, skills, and resources to continue to exist . . . as independent countries.

There is underway a contest to determine where allegiances in these nations will be directed. Communist powers remain dedicated to world revolution.

Moscow's expansionist philosophy has not been abandoned, though the methods of achieving it have changed. And a new and far more aggressive Communist power—Red China—has complicated the global picture and worsened it.

Thus the political world we live in is still dominated by a major struggle between communism and anticommunism. But now there are several brands of communism, and many kinds of anticommunism and noncommunism.

Where is the contest waged?

. . . in Africa, Latin America, and, most threatened, the Middle East and southeast Asia. Hundreds of millions of uncommitted peoples—passive, ignorant, poverty-stricken, with no sense of identification with either side, no real sense of national loyalties—are the weathervanes of tomorrow's history.

The stakes are huge . . .

He identifies our antagonists:

Over and above all other considerations, we face a continuing struggle, with no end in sight—against an aggressive, expansionist Communist Russia and Communist China, and against plain "have-not" nations, intent on acquiring what we have.

Yet, among the millions of uncommitted whom Baldwin discusses are leadership groups friendly to us. They are friendly to us at least to the degree that they do not want their own governments undercut and taken over by Communists.

We have mutual interest with these people. To the degree that the Communist stance would be strengthened by converting these people and their resources to the Communist cause, so the Communist potential for strength is weakened as we help these leadership groups maintain their own national independence from Communist subversion.

They do not understand the method of aggression against them. We do not fully understand it. It is in our interest, as well as in theirs, to familiarize

them as well as we can with the challenge they face, while at the same time acquiring full comprehension of the threat ourselves.

The problem calls for dual effort: Intensive research and extensive training. This is what we propose in S. 1232.

What works against enactment of this bill? Mr. Baldwin's discussion of domestic factors affecting our global strategy affords some insight:

The quality of idealism in the American people, which is reflected in our foreign policies . . . [is] an essential and desirable part of the American dream. But it has found expression in such unrealistic terms as "to make the world safe for democracy"; a "war to end war"; "the Four Freedoms"; "universal and complete disarmament." And it can and often does mean a trend toward "do-goodism," toward unrealistic, extreme aims or naive goals.

Perhaps this quality explains the State Department contention that Freedom Academy sponsors propose to imitate Communist methods. We emphatically do not.

We propose to understand Communist methods, in order to prepare our people to counteract those methods more effectively.

Mr. Baldwin poses, and then answers, several final questions:

Where does all this lead us? What should our national strategy be? What should be the principles that govern it . . . ?

The principles should be:

1. Collective security—not isolation. . . .
2. Flexibility—the avoidance of frozen thoughts and ideas and structures.
3. A national and Presidential will and determination to defend our vital interests. Power is of little value without the will to use it.

Establishment of the Freedom Academy would be consistent with, and responsive to Mr. Baldwin's understanding. It would lead to better comprehension of the struggle we are in and to far superior dissemination of this understanding among people who need it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the Hanson W. Baldwin's article, entitled "U.S. Global Strategy," appearing in Ordinance for November-December 1964, be printed in the RECORD after my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Ordinance, Nov. 12, 1964]

U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY
(Hanson W. Baldwin)

National strategy is the utilization of all elements of a nation's power to achieve its objectives. It must be couched in the active, not the passive, tense. It implies the implementation of a course of action—not merely the formulation of it.

The equations produced in the process of strategy formulation do not lend themselves to computer solutions, or to percentage calculations. For we are dealing, in the last analysis, with human beings. Whether human beings are rational or not is a matter of debate, but certainly it is true that the emotions which make human beings tick are intangibles. How, for instance, do you crank anger into a calculating machine?

This is simply to suggest that we must beware of too great a dependence upon the tools of the trade; we must not make these

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tools our rules. As aids to problem solving, computers, qualitative, quantitative and operational analyses, cost-effectiveness yardsticks, and the like are useful and proper. But do not confuse the means with the ends.

There should be one other cautionary caveat before we consider the factors that might go into the formulation and implementation of a national strategy. This is, of course, a statement of the obvious, but nevertheless a rule which history sometimes has disregarded. That is that no sound national strategy can spring fully armed from the brain of one man. It must, unless it is to be dangerously oversimplified or grossly distorted, represent the efforts of many, the input of scores of professional disciplines and thousands of facts distilled from a nation's treasure house of experts. It must be the product of many ideas and of the labor of many men—strategy, if you like, by committee or group action.

Such strategy may not appear to be as brilliant or as bold as the imaginative and ambitious unilateral plans of an Alexander, a Genghis Khan, a Napoleon, a Hitler. But where are those conquerors, and what were the bequests—save corpses unlimited—they left their nations?

Not even the President of the United States should have—nor is he likely to want—absolute power in the formulation of national strategy. This is too great a grant of power to entrust to the hands of any human, no matter how selfless and capable.

The formulation and the implementation of national strategy, then, must be a collective, a group effort, and human judgment, experience, knowledge, and emotion, as well as all the computers and technical tools and methods available to modern science, must be used in its formulation.

Strategy—like war—is an art and not a science. A long view of history is essential to sound strategy.

Consider some of the factors that influence or govern the formulation and implementation of an national strategy for the United States in the year 1964. First and most important of these is:

1. The global political situation: A situation of dangerous instability exists. World War II continued a process started in World War I—the destruction of the old order, the upset of the balance of power, the unleashing of revolutionary forces. Empires, dynasties, great states, and great princes fell from power; nations that were once great were all but destroyed; others were diminished in influence.

Vacuum of power resulted, and a bipolar world emerged from the ashes of conflict, with the United States and Soviet Russia so far superior to other powers that they could only be called superstates.

But this bipolar condition has changed. There have been splits and defections in the Western World, and cracks in the monolithic edifice of communism. Today we face a multipolar world—a world of infinite complexity.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. are still the major nations of the world in terms of power, but neither can count on complete support from its friends and allies. In the West, France, intent under De Gaulle in achieving once again the sense of "grandeur" and "greatness" which has always been an inseparable part of French achievements, is pursuing an individual—sometimes a solitary—course. The United States plays largely a lone hand in Asia.

But Russia's Eastern European satellites—notably, at the moment, Poland and Rumania, are restive. They are inspired to greater aspirations for national independence by the example of Tito's brand of national communism—as distinct from the international brand dominated by Moscow—and particularly by Mao Tse-tung's opposition to the Khrushchev policy.

The Sino-Soviet split is serious, and probably lasting. It started as a conflict of personalities and ideologies. It is possible that at some future time the split may be "papered over." But lasting causes of friction—in terms of real power rivalries—will continue to exist: border problems—Central Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria; pressures of tremendous Chinese population—700 million to a billion people close to the sparsely settled areas of Soviet Siberia; the obvious dangers to Russia of a China industrialized and equipped with atomic weapons.

In the last decade—particularly in the past 5 years—new political power centers have been created in our turbulent world—Peiping, Tokyo, New Delhi, Cairo, Latin America, Africa.

A great many of the new nations—such as most of the African states—are nations in quotes, incapable of governing themselves—countries almost certainly destined to disappear from the map of history.

Many of them do not have the political, economic, or military power, or the population, skills, and resources to continue to exist as they are now constituted as independent countries.

Anticolonialism, one of the great political factors of the postwar period, has so far been a great unsettling and destabilizing influence.

The diplomat George Kennan, under the pseudonym of "Mr. X," was the original author—in a famous article in *Foreign Affairs*—of our "containment" policy. He wrote that the seeds of communism contain within themselves their own destruction, that if we could hold or "contain" Russian power within its frontiers, the forces of change would be bound to leaven Soviet society and reduce the aggressive expansionism of Moscow.

It didn't work. Communism expanded to Czechoslovakia, Red China, North Vietnam, and Cuba. And though Soviet communism has changed, Moscow's expansionist philosophy has not been abandoned, though the methods of achieving it have changed. And a new and far more aggressive Communist power—Red China—has complicated the global picture and worsened it.

Thus today the political world we live in is still dominated by a major struggle between communism and anticommunism. But now there are several brands of communism, and many kinds of anticommunism and noncommunism.

There are many kinds of neutralist, and there are all kinds of local and regional problems which complicate the main stream of conflict—the Kashmir problem for instance; the ambitions of the demagogues Sukarno; the machinations of Castro; Nasser's Pan-Arabism; the tribal warfare of Yemen; religious frictions and racial problems.

All these local problems are influenced and may be exploited by communism or anti-communism, with resultant back currents, eddies, whirlpools, rapids.

In today's complex world the frontiers of freedom are rather well defined in Europe. Except for divided Berlin and its access approaches there is little room for political ambiguity. Communist transgressions to the west of the Iron Curtain would mean war.

But there is no such clearly defined frontier in Africa, Latin America, and, most threatened, the Middle East and southeast Asia. Hundreds of millions of uncommitted peoples—passive, ignorant, poverty stricken, with no sense of identification with either side, no real sense of national loyalties—are the weathervanes of tomorrow's history.

The stakes are huge—rubber, tin, oil, minerals, strategic position. More and more the tides of history have been sweeping to the full in Asia; we shall forget at our peril the alleged dictum of Lenin—that the road to Paris lies through Peiping.

Over and above all other considerations, we face a continuing struggle, with no end in sight—against an aggressive, expansionist Communist Russia and Communist China, and against plain have-not nations, intent on acquiring what we have.

2. The nature of the threat: Put tersely, the threat is opportunistic, massive, and unrelenting, and it takes many forms—ideological, political, economic, psychological, and military. We must be prepared for a spectrum of conflict—from such nuclear power confrontations as the Cuban missile crisis to a twilight war against Communist puppets.

But by far the greatest threat—one that has so far frustrated us—is the so-called war of national liberation, the kind of guerrilla, terrorist, and insurgency conflict now being waged in South Vietnam.

3. Technological revolution: A third factor is the technological revolution, still unended: A-bombs, radar, nuclear power, etc.

The military meaning of the revolution is plain—for the first time since the days of the Indian wars we face the danger of devastating surprise attack—an attack which could eliminate us as a nation. The technological revolution has caused a shrinkage of maps; a major change in the time-space factor; foreshortened distances; rapid communications.

The technological revolution has obvious political, economic, and educational importance. The smaller world has political disadvantages as well as advantages. The crisis is on your doorstep every morning. It hasn't made all men brothers and is unlikely to do so. Economically, the technological revolution requires great sums to keep abreast in the technological race; a nation must have industrial power and superb skills.

The technological revolution means we must steer between the twin rocks of disaster—the garrison state—a state so militarized and guarded that liberties are sacrificed in the name of security—and the bankrupt state—a state bled white by expenditure for technological advance.

Yet we must steer the middle passage, since a major factor in the formulation of a strategy for our times is that the technological revolution is still unfinished.

4. A fourth factor which must be considered in the formulation of strategy is an economic one: It can be compressed into two phrases—"the revolution of rising expectations" and the "industrialization of hitherto undeveloped nations."

Many of the backward peoples of the world, lured by the promises of both communism and capitalism and vulnerable because of modern communications to new ideas, expect far more than their fathers had. They want what others have.

Some of them, to accomplish this, are attempting to industrialize hitherto agrarian, or undeveloped, economies, as in India, Egypt, and Cuba. The mixture is both politically and economically explosive.

5. A fifth factor is the population explosion: The world's population has increased from 1.2 billion in 1850 to 3.2 billion today, and there are no signs of any immediate leveling off. One may argue all one wants about the world's ability to feed and clothe and employ this vast and teeming mass; the plain fact of the matter is that the world isn't doing it, and the immense problems—religious taboos in India, for example—between the dream and the accomplishment make its realization unlikely. This, too, causes world instability, and the pressure of population increases the pent-up and revolutionary forces against every government.

6. The increasing dispersion of nuclear weapons: This factor is, of course, interrelated with all the others. It might be described as a "political" and a psychological factor, but more properly its importance is such that it stands alone as a factor which can well increase international instability.

France today has joined the "nuclear club" in a small way; in time, Paris will achieve a significant capability. Red China recently detonated her first atomic device. Now that she has, the political and psychological effects will reverberate through the Orient.

It will be a long time before Peiping achieves a really important or significant nuclear delivery capability, but when this occurs the world may be in real danger.

Other nations soon may join the atomic club. With each new membership the world's power balance, particularly in the regions affected, shifts slightly.

7. A seventh factor is the growing challenge of Soviet aerospace power and particularly of Soviet maritime power.

Soviet strategic thought has grown from the introverted "heartland" concept of warfare to the extroverted global and extraterrestrial "new look."

In the past, danger had always come to Russia by land. Hitler, and Napoleon before him, almost—but not quite—conquered Russia. The land marshals until relatively recently dominated Soviet strategic thinking; the buffer states of Eastern Europe attested to Moscow's fear of land invasion.

Today, Russia is looking upward to sky and space, and outward toward the seven seas. Her space achievements need no chronicling; they will continue, and if we have any doubts about Soviet determination to put a "comrade" on the moon, we may awake one morning to another disagreeable surprise. Russia already has become a major air and space power—ahead of us in the utilization of man in space.

Not so well known are her accomplishments at sea. She is second in total naval power, first in numbers of submarines, first in numbers of small craft, such as minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and coastal defense vessels. (The United States has nothing like the missile-equipped Komar torpedo boats.)

Russia is first in deep-sea fishing fleets—both in numbers and quality. She already operates more ocean-going merchant ships than we do, and her total tonnage is expected to pass our declining merchant marine within the next two years.

Moscow plans a tremendous merchant fleet—which can only be used for global trade purposes and for the export of subversion as well as goods—which may approximate 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 gross tons by 1975-1980—the largest in the world.

The United States and all the maritime nations of the non-Communist world face major competition on the seas and in world trade.

So much for some—but by no means all—of the international factors that must be considered in the formulation of our objectives and our strategy.

What are some of the domestic factors? First and perhaps of greatest long-term importance is the lack of national homogeneity in the American Nation. We are no longer "one people" in the old sense of 50 years ago. There are now major religious, ethnic, and racial—as well as political—differences which cannot be easily healed (e.g., civil rights and the school-prayer issue).

The growth of big government and the trend toward centralization of power, with all the difficulties and delays that size, redundancy, and bureaucracy imply, make the formulation of policy—and sometimes its implementation—exceedingly slow.

Command and control systems of uncanny global capabilities can conn a destroyer off Cuba or direct a battalion in Vietnam, but it has yet to be proved that this centralized Washington command post can win wars.

Never in the history of human conflict have so many been able to say "No"—so few to say "Yes."

The tremendous increase in the power of the Presidency and the decline in the power

of Congress is another factor to be considered. Congress is supposed to have the constitutional power to declare war and to raise and maintain armies and navies. But in the age of the technological revolution and of \$50 billion defense budgets, the effective power has passed from the hands of Congress to the hands of the Executive. The President can put us into war overnight by action, or inaction; Congress can only countersign.

The power of the Presidency—partly because of modern communications—transcends today by an immense margin what our Founding Fathers intended it to be. And, correspondingly, the personality, and the character of the President, his strength of will, his purpose and judgment, are major—perhaps decisive—factors in strategy formulation and particularly in implementation. Leadership and personality are the x factor in history.

The quality of idealism in the American people, which is reflected in our foreign policies. Make no mistake, this is an essential and desirable part of the American dream. But it has found expression in such unrealistic terms as "to make the world safe for democracy"; a "war to end war"; "the Four Freedoms"; "universal and complete disarmament." And it can and often does mean a trend toward "do-goodism," toward unrealistic, extreme aims or naive goals.

The need for explanation. The American public's "right to know" is not only a constitutional safeguard to our system of government and a monitor of government, but public information about and explanation of national objectives is essential to the attainment of these objectives.

This is particularly true in the kind of war we are most likely to have to fight—the type of counterinsurgency conflict we are now waging in Vietnam.

Public support for any long-drawn-out war of attrition is essential to success. A frank, comprehensive, and reasoned public-information policy on the part of all branches of government is essential to enlistment of that support for the duration. Otherwise public frustration or apathy or even opposition is bound to develop.

Washington, which so successfully enlisted Madison Avenue in the domestic political hustlings, has made a botch of retaining public support for some of its national policies.

The quality of our peoples is another factor of importance to our consideration of strategy. What has been called the "crisis of values" has influenced contemporary history—and particularly Western civilization.

The loss of old values, the lack of faith in ancient symbols and old loyalties, are reflected in our rising crime rate, juvenile delinquency, inflated divorce statistics. And the draft rejection rate of 40 to 50 percent reflects the physical as well as the mental softness of too many American youths.

Slums, the problems of automation, unemployment, our decaying cities, our obsolescent railroads, depressed areas, inadequate education—all of these factors will influence the capability of the peoples of the United States for democratic self-government and for the projection of national power.

There are, of course, other domestic factors, which need not even the briefest elucidation. For instance: the capabilities of our economy and our industrial base; its strengths and limitations; the capabilities of our Armed Forces; their strengths and limitations, including the effects of current trends upon their morale and leadership and the downgrading of professional experience and judgment; the "civillization" of the military profession; and, most important, our interpretation of foreign and potential enemy strengths and capabilities—our global intelligence system.

So much for some of the factors that go into the formulation of our objectives and our strategy.

Here are some of our national objectives which will, of course, influence the formulation of our strategy:

1. Economic prosperity and political freedom. This implies a vigorously expanding gross national product and some accommodation for the racial problem, for the problem of automation, and for depressed areas.

2. Maintain our global lead in industrial power, particularly in the capital-goods industries. Easier said than done; there are some serious lags now—machine tools, shipbuilding.

3. Stress educational quality, rather than quantity—particularly at collegiate levels; extend technical and trades training and physical fitness to lower age levels.

4. Foster educational, historical, religious, civic, and other appropriate programs for inculcation into the body and mind politic of the lasting values that have, in the past, made us great.

5. Extend the program of Peace Corps activities and civic action—including construction, training, and health programs by the Armed Forces.

6. Maintain—and if possible extend—the overall U.S. lead in the technological revolution, particularly in weapons applications.

7. Lead the world in the exploration and exploitation of space and the ocean depths.

8. Maintain and improve a global and space reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence system.

9. Maintain qualitative and quantitative naval and air superiority, and qualitative superiority on land.

10. Maintain U.S. entree to the Eurasian "rimlands"—the islands and coastal regions of Europe and Asia.

11. Delay, and if possible prevent, the industrialization and modernization of Communist China.

12. Exploit frictions and strains in the Communist world.

13. Weaken and ultimately eliminate Communist government in Cuba.

14. Revitalize and strengthen the Monroe Doctrine; i.e., prevent Communist coups and conquests in the Western Hemisphere.

15. Strengthen the Western and anti-Communist position in southeast Asia.

Fundamentally the Nation's objectives might be summed up as follows:

Globally—a more stable world (note I do not say a peaceful world).

Domestically—a nation where government and machine serve humanity.

It may be said that these objectives represent merely the old formula of being against sin and for God and country. This may be a fair criticism. But a nation's objectives must, "like a man's reach exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"

Objectives, too, should be accorded priorities. What is clearly vital to the Nation's survival and welfare must be so identified; what is attainable in the short-term view must be so labeled; and more distant objectives must be so itemized. Too often we tend to label as "vital," interests which actually are remote.

Certainly what happens in many parts of Africa is not immediately vital to the United States and is not likely to become so unless there is a threat of Communist domination of the entire continent.

It may even be argued that we assumed too casually the obligations of power when we interviewed in southeast Asia. Is Laos vital to the United States? Is South Vietnam? These are the \$64 million questions which policymakers must answer when they enunciate national objectives.

Where does all this lead us? What should our national strategy be? What should be the principles that govern it—the principles derived from the factors considered and the national objectives just summarized?

The principles should be:

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1. Collective security—not isolation. (The lay of isolation is ended—the world needs us, we need the world.)

2. Flexibility—the avoidance of frozen thoughts and ideas and structures; no Maginot Line concept, no static defense.

3. A national and Presidential will and determination to defend our vital interests. Power is of little value without the will to use it.

RESOLUTIONS OF RICHARDSON, TEX., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Chamber of Commerce of Richardson, Tex., has recently adopted three resolutions with which I am pleased to find myself in complete agreement. In order that other Senators may be advised of the views of this active and dedicated chamber, I ask unanimous consent that the three resolutions be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE COMMENDING POLICY DECLARATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND PROPOSING A JOHNSON COMMISSION FOR IMPLEMENTING THEM

The board of directors of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce commends President Johnson upon his strong policy declarations for strict economy and an all-out campaign against waste and inefficiency in the Federal Government; for his proposal to reshape and reorganize the executive branch to meet more effectively the tasks of the 20th century; for his resolve to keep our Nation prosperous, militarily strong, and a leader in seeking peaceful relation with the other nations of his world; for his plans to pursue relentlessly our advances toward the conquest of space; his proposed new efforts to control and prevent crime and delinquency; and for the translation of these policies and plans to recommendations submitted to Congress.

To implement the goal of strict economy in the Federal Government and thus to aid in the attainment of all its goals, the Board of Directors of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce suggests that the President and Congress consider jointly the creation of a strong nonpartisan commission to be organized in the spirit of the Hoover Commissions of the past; that it consist of citizens of experience in Federal, State, and local governments but without other offices in any of such governments; that this commission be given a modest staff and authority to consider the physical records of the office of the budget and all other Federal offices and be charged with a duty to recommend to the President any and all reductions of current expenses in any such office which, in the opinion of that commission, could be made without adversely affecting policies of the administration with reference to the functioning of that office and the services to be performed by it. We suggest that such a commission be organized with expected continuity of office assured by overlapping terms of the members of the commission. It is submitted that an expansion of services of the Federal Government now under consideration will substantially increase the need of such an independent study of the operations of each department and agency of the Federal Government to the end that the dollar value of each dollar spent may be assured; accordingly, it is

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce urges the establishment of such a nonpartisan Johnson commission to implement the policies of this administration

for strict economy; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas Members of the U.S. Congress. (Unanimously adopted in regular meeting, Mar. 15, 1965.)

RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE AMENDING TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Whereas it has been and is an American precept that man is a being with a free will, so endowed by his Creator; and

Whereas the system of free enterprise is peculiarly and especially a cherished American tradition, applying alike to the business enterprise and to the individual, to the employee, and to the employer; and

Whereas expressions of these propositions are included in many acts of social legislation; they are particularly emphasized, for example, in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964:

"Sec. 703(a). It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Whereas these propositions are a fundamental part of the laws of Texas, as seen in sections 1 and 2 of article 5207a of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, which was enacted in 1947 by the Legislature of the State of Texas in reliance upon section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 164(b)).

Taft-Hartley Act, section 14(b): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or territorial law."

Article 5207a, Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes:

"SECTION 1. The inherent right of a person to work and bargain freely with his employer, individually or collectively, for terms and conditions of his employment shall not be denied or infringed by law, or by any organization of whatever nature.

"Sec. 2. No person shall be denied employment on account of membership or non-membership in a labor union"; and

Whereas there now are before the Congress of the United States proposals aimed at repealing 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, quoted in part hereinabove, so that laws of this State of Texas guaranteeing to individuals the right of free determination whether to join or refrain from joining, a labor union, would be preempted: Therefore be it

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce opposes the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, quoted above; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas members of the U.S. Congress.

(Unanimously adopted in regular meeting Mar. 15, 1965.)

RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE FOR ELDER CITIZENS

The provision and the utilization of adequate health services to citizens above 65 years of age is a matter of interest and concern to all public spirited citizens.

Studies, including the 1963 Report of the President's Council on Aging, indicate that elderly citizens as a group meet their costs of living, including health care, much better

than the younger ages and enjoy remarkably good health for the most part. Over sixty percent of the 18 million elderly in the United States carry some form of voluntary prepayment health insurance; 72 percent of Texas' elderly citizens are so covered.

Yet many citizens do need additional aid such as those on old age assistance, or others who become really burdened in meeting the costs of an unexpected or major illness. Those who need assistance and only those, can get it under the Kerr-Mills Law passed in 1960. We in Texas amended our constitution in November 1964, so as to increase the benefits obtainable under this 1960 law, by those needy and elderly in Texas. Governor Connally stated in his annual message to the Texas Legislature in January 1965, that he favors this solution of the problem. It gives aid only to those in need whereas the social security approach assures aid to all employed, when they become ill in elder years, regardless of need and at much greater cost to all.

On January 27, 1965, Congressman HERLONG and Congressman CURTIS introduced identical bill, H. R. 3727 and H.R. 3728 known as the Eldercare Act of 1965. Aid to those in need under the Herlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965, would consist of medical, surgical, dental, hospital, nursing home, and drug benefits rather than being limited to hospital and nursing home care. State and Federal funds would be provided on a sliding scale basis, to persons aged 65 or older who are in need, as defined by their incomes, the defining limits being set by the individual States. Recipients would obtain policies providing a wide spectrum of medical, surgical, and hospital benefits from health insurance companies or from Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans. Under the proposal an individual would pay all, part, or none of the cost of the policy, depending upon his total income. Individuals whose incomes are under specified minimums would have the entire cost of the policy paid by the State agency that would administer the program. Eligibility for benefits would be determined solely by use of a simple information return in which the applicant would list his income from all sources.

The Herlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965 would thus maintain the basic principles that persons 65 years or older who need help in paying for health care should receive help, but only they; that maximum responsibility and authority for providing such help should be retained by the States; and that funds from the Federal source should be from general tax revenues; and that voluntary health insurance and prepayment principles should be utilized whenever possible.

All this is in sharp contrast with the proposed King-Anderson principle of a compulsory health insurance plan whereby social security taxes or payroll taxes on all ages of working citizens would provide certain limited hospital and nursing home benefits to the elderly.

Meanwhile, the provisions of the Kerr-Mills law have been accepted to greater or lesser degree by approximately 45 States and territories. There have been inequities and difficulties, but such problems existing in some States can be rapidly overcome. In Texas, our legislature is expected to provide quickly for those elderly citizens in need of further assistance by legislation under the Kerr-Mills Act: Therefore, be it

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce favors the enactment by Congress of the Herlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965 and by the legislature of Texas of legislation implementing assistance to the elderly in Texas in need, under the Kerr-Mills Act; and opposes the pending King-Anderson bill in Congress or other like measures; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Cham-

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ber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas Members of the U.S. Congress.

(Adopted in regular meeting, March 16, 1965.)

SOVIET PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, 20 years ago the most terrible war ever fought by mankind came to an end. With it there came the hope that religious persecution would forever be banished from the face of the earth. The shocking discovery of the scope of Jewish persecution under Hitler initiated vows by all men never to allow such events to happen again.

These vows were founded on something more than naive idealism, for while such action is against every conceivable code of moral order and decency, it is also a fact that such persecution will bring about the degeneration of a country by excluding from the national life a valuable portion of the intellectual and manpower resources of the country. It has become increasingly evident, however, that the Soviet Union is in the process of throwing these beliefs and hopes against the rocks with all the force its totalitarian strength can bring to bear.

The Soviet Union has extreme methods to hide events in its country that it feels might not be considered in good taste by those outside the Iron Curtain. Yet all of its suppression has not been sufficient to hide its dastardly acts toward its Jewish population. For the past 20 years, free people everywhere have hoped that persecution of religious peoples had ended for all time; yet, at this very instant, the persecution in Russia is looking distressingly similar to the persecution that took place during the Third Reich.

We see the singling out of the Russian Jews for allegations that have no basis whatsoever. As under the tyrannical regime of Hitler, the Jews in the Soviet Union have been singled out as the cause of the country's economic failures.

The propaganda that has been aimed at the Jewish population of the Soviet Union has been of the most vulgar nature, depicting the Jews in the same stereotype that was used by Goebbels, under Hitler, for the vilification of religion and all those who practice it.

There has also been widespread exclusion of the Jews from the same educational, cultural, and employment opportunities that the other Soviet citizens have been offered.

Mr. President, in view of these facts, I think the time has come for all good people to unite and, in a voice that will shatter the stone walls of the Kremlin, demand that these practices of persecution, bigotry, and hate be put to an end.

We have before us a concurrent resolution, submitted by the able Senator from Connecticut, that will inform the dictators of the Soviet people of our determination to put a stop to religious persecution in all its forms, wherever it occurs on earth. I have cosponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 in the belief that the United States has an obligation, as the leader of free peoples, to step forward and condemn these malicious practices.

The resolution is clear in its intent. It states, in brief, that because we steadfastly believe in the freedom of all peoples to practice their religion, without interference of any sort; because the evidence overwhelmingly points to purposely vicious persecution of its Jewish population; and because the Soviet Constitution clearly defends religious freedom; we, therefore, condemn the Soviet Union for its betrayal of the principles of human rights and decency, in the hope that the Soviet Union will restore the rights of the Jews to practice their religion, free from harassment, and to maintain their culture as they have done throughout their history.

At this time, I urge every Senator to support this resolution reaffirming our belief in human rights; I urge all Members of the House of Representatives to join their Senate colleagues in the support of this resolution; and I urge all freedom-loving people the world over to join hands with the American people in asking freedom and dignity for the Jewish citizens of the Soviet Union.

LOW UNEMPLOYMENT GOOD NEWS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, we are now entering the fifth year of continued improvement in our economy. This is the longest sustained economic expansion in the postwar period. As the employment statistics announced by the Labor Department today show, this fifth year promises to be one of the brightest.

The unemployment figures for the breadwinners of the country have been cut almost in half since the first quarter of 1961. At that point married men had an unemployment rate of 4.8 percent and today it has dropped to 2.6. This is equal to the low level recorded during the 1955-57 expansion period.

The economic growth since March a year ago—1,650,000—has meant jobs for 800,000 more adult men, 700,000 more adult women, and 200,000 more teenagers.

This is truly good news. It demonstrates that bold leadership given the tools to work with can keep the Nation on a prosperity-bound course.

We are indeed "continuing" toward the Great Society President Johnson seeks.

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING: STAR-SPANGLED ARCHITECTURAL BLUNDER

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, Members of the Congress apparently are so well aware of the barbarian architectural qualities—if one can use the word "qualities" in this regard—of the third House office building that it is hardly necessary to bring to their attention additional informed judgments. Nevertheless, I think the Record should include a recent appraisal of the Rayburn Building by Miss Ada Louise Huxtable, as published in the New York Times of March 30, 1965.

Miss Huxtable concludes her lament about this artless and unbelievably expensive structure with a reference to a saying that "there's no point in crying over spilled marble." But if we should

not cry, we must at least be severely embarrassed, and should resolve to halt these economic and architectural atrocities on Capitol Hill.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 30, 1965]
THE RAYBURN BUILDING: HOUSE OFFICE STRUCTURE IS DESCRIBED AS A DULL, VULGAR, CORRUPT BLUNDER

(By Ada Louise Huxtable)

It is moving time on Capitol Hill for 169 Congressmen eligible for space in the new Rayburn House Office Building. The structure's three-room suites complete with refrigerators and safes are being raffled off to applicants who may have a view of the Capitol dome or an interior court, depending on seniority. Even seniority, however, does not give any legislator a door leading from his office, or his aid's office, to his working staff without passage through a waiting room full of constituents and special pleaders. To correct this small planning error would add \$200,000 to costs already estimated at anywhere from \$86 million to \$122 million for the expensive and controversial building.

Some Congressmen are moving in reluctantly. Representative THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Democrat, of Ohio, for one rejected his office on sight. But he is making the move anyway this week because his present quarters are too small.

"This layout could paralyze us," he said during his inspection tour. "It's an ugly building."

Mr. ASHLEY is not alone. The professional architectural press has been bitterly critical as construction progressed. (The building has taken 7 years and \$22 million more to complete than originally estimated largely as the result of expensive miscalculations; change orders have reached 300 percent over Government average; bid estimates on contracts have been as much as \$45 million off.)

There have been accusations of secret planning, pork barrel commissions and possible misuse of public funds. The fact that the general contractor was Matthew J. McCloske, Democratic Party stalwart of Philadelphia has not escaped notice. But the storm swirls uselessly around a behemoth that is obviously here to stay.

DEFECTS ARE NUMEROUS

Architecturally, the Rayburn Building is a national disaster. Its defects range from profligate mishandling of 50 acres of space to elephantine esthetic banality at record costs. The costs are now being investigated by the General Accounting Office.

Equal to the question of costs, however, is the question of what Congress and the capital have received for the investment. It is quite possible that this is the worst building for the most money in the history of the construction art. It stuns by sheer mass and boring bulk. Only 15 percent of its space is devoted to the offices and hearing rooms for which it was erected.

Forty-two percent of the floor area is used for parking. Endless corridors have been likened to "Last Year at Marienbad." Stylistically, it is the apotheosis of humdrum.

It is hard to label the building, but it might be called Corrupt Classic. Its empty, aridity and degraded classical details are vulgarization without drama, and to be both dull and vulgar may be an achievement of sorts.

The structure's chief design features are hollow exercises in sham grandeur. A super-colossal exterior expanse of stolid, Mussolini-style pomp is embellished with sculpture that would be the apogee of art in the Soviet Union, where overscaled muscles and ex-